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Abstract 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998 are two events that share a 
common characteristic.  Both can be seen as a network crisis, though one is global and the other is regional.  
The world or region is currently highly inter-connected and inter-dependent through trade, finance and 
telecommunication networks that transfer information and property rights that shape behaviour across 
networks.  This can be illustrated through behaviour in highly complex and deep financial markets, such as 
behaviour in currency markets arising from contagion and inter-action between market forces that create 
unexpected risks.  This paper introduces a Phasor method to capture the often ignored long-tailed black swan 
risk, also known as rare events.  Using the augmented network theory (Sheng, Kwek, Cho, 2009), based on 
principles of engineering and physics, we model the market movements caused by the confluence of 
different market forces, by transforming the market movements (x,y) into sinusoidal waves (cosθ, sinθ).  In 
particular, when the two forces collide (cosθ = sinθ), they create directions that are not always predictable, 
though the amplitude of the sine waves and the cosine waves are predictable.  To demonstrate this network 
effect, nine currencies, i.e. the Indonesian Rupiah, Chinese Renminbi, Hong Kong dollar, Korean Won, 
Japanese Yen, Malaysian Ringgit, Philippines Peso, Singapore dollar, and Thai Baht are modeled through 
the Phasor theory in the currency markets.  The results of the study do show that we are able to capture these 
rare events.  While not all directional changes are predictable due to lack of contextual information that we 
may not be able to capture, there are certain patterns of behaviour that conform with tools common in 
engineering and physics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A common concept shared between economics, and engineering and mathematics is the concept of 
stable states.  It is about a system gravitating towards equilibrium points, and mathematically is also 
known as eigenstates or eigenfunctions.  However, such states are often difficult to achieve.  
Especially in economics, there always exists opposing and asymmetric forces that influence the 
gravitation of the point towards equilibrium.  If the overall feedback of the system is negative, then 
the system will tend to be stable.  This rarely happens.  If overall feedback of the system is positive, 
the system will result in a runaway situation.  In particular in rare events, like an unpredictable 
pertubation, it can cause the positive feedback to result in excessive high amplification of these 
signals.  These rare events are caused by speculative attacks that can distress the financial markets, 
leading to disorderly markets and systemic risks. 
 
Such targeted or speculative attacks are associated with long-tailed networks.  One of the features 
found in long-tailed networks is that the rare event has a major impact.  For example, the Iceland's 
Eyjafjallajokull volcanic incident of April 13, 2010, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 
2007/2009, and the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997/98 (triggered by the financial collapse of 
the Thai baht), have one common feature: a single event that spewed-out into widespread global or 
regional fallouts, affecting a wider network of networks (e.g. from airlines to rail lines, from 
housing market to financial markets) with a display of feedback mechanisms seen in network 
behavior (Allen and Gale, 2000). 
 
There has been no comprehensive study on capturing targeted attacks using network theory.  Here, 
we report the existence of an alternating feedback mechanism in currency markets using a network-
phasor model for the purpose of capturing targeted attacks.  We show that economic systems also 
display behavioral patterns of a network effect based on principles common to engineering and 
physics.  This study adds to a line of new thinking to model financial network risk (Anderson 
(2006), Beinhocker (2005), Taleb (2007), Soros (1987)).  Bankers and financial economists are 
now working with mathematical biologists to learn lessons about resilience from natural 
ecosystems.  Bank of England’s Haldane (2009) has begun to look at the banking regulatory 
structure as one biological “complex adaptive system” (Cookson, Tett, and Cook (2009), May, 
Levin, and Sugihara (2008)). 
 
This study also advances Barabasi’s (1999, 2002) scale-free networks to currency and financial 
markets by characterizing financial risks as systemic and having ‘small-world’ property with fat-
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tailed network characteristics1.  In particular, economic systems that displays small-world network 
and fat-tailed network characteristics are vulnerable to targeted/speculative attacks, known as 
‘Black Swan risk’ (Watts (2003), Anderson (2006), Taleb (2007), Newman (2003)).  Black Swans 
(Taleb, 2007) are defined as an event with three attributes (a) rarity, (b) extreme impact, and (c) 
retrospective predictability.   
 
In particular, we show that when targeted attacks strike at a node with the weakest link, the impact 
may destroy its original structure.  New policy measures are instituted, and often time, this new 
structure may adopt an exact opposite feature.  For example, in the exchange rate regimes, a 
country that adopts a floating regime in pre-crisis, may switch to a fixed rate regime in the post-
crisis, like the Thai Baht.  However, nodes with stronger links (with deep financial markets) can 
absorb these long-tailed shocks better than those with weaker links, like the Singaporean dollar.   
 
This paper examines the network effect of systemic risks which are characterized by long-tailed 
network and ‘small-world’ property in exchange rate systems.  Section 2 discusses the connectivity 
characteristics in financial networks.  Section 3 introduces a dynamic phasor model to capture the 
long-tailed network characteristics due to exchange rate distortions.  Section 4 give the empirical 
feedback mechanism in the network-phasors.  Section 5 examines the policy-space in the network-
phasors.  Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Connectivity Characteristics in Financial Networks  
 
Currency markets are connected as a network of nodes and links, where the nodes represent 
countries, and the links represent the bilateral exchange rates (which determines the financial flow).  
Long-tailed network in the currency markets have two specific characteristics about their 
connectivity or links.  First, long-tailed network exhibits the degree distribution that is thin in the 
middle and fat in the tails.  In particular, it is characterized by a large number of small (weak) links 
and a small number of large (strong) links.  Haldane (2009) pointed out that networks with long-
tailed distributions have shown to be more robust to random disturbances, but more susceptible to 
targeted attacks.  This is because most random shocks strike at the periphery of the network where 
their impact is distributed and can be absorbed easily.  However, the impact of a targeted attack that 
strike at one of the massively connected nodes can spread to its entire network and the whole 
network can collapse (Haldane (2009), Dowe (2009)).   
 
Figure 1 illustrates the long tail and the Black Swan event.  The long-tail statistical property is 
found in a power law distribution curve, or Pareto distribution, where a larger share of population 
rests within the tail of a probability distribution.  To the right of the curve is the long tail and to the 
left are the few that dominate. 
 
                                                            
1 Long tail and scalability are exact opposite. 
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Figure 1  Long Tail and Black Swan 
 
Notes:  To the right is the long tail and to the left are the few that dominate. 
Source:  “Long Tail 101” URL: http://www.longtail.com/the_long_tail/2005/09/long_tail_101.html/ 
 
 
The second characteristic of a fat-tailed network is about small-world property.  Small-world 
property displays the mechanics of six-degrees of separation, that is, the network has the potential 
for local disturbances to make long leaps.  The subprime mortgage crisis in the U.S. displayed this 
characteristic, where infected banks that carry toxic assets infected another banks across the 
Atlantic in a short period of time.  These banks are super nodes (JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, 
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Barclays Capital, Royal Bank of Scotland, Deutsche Bank, etc). 
 
Some of these other properties of the global financial network and its consequences for stability are 
discussed in Haldane (2009).  Haldane pointed out four key factors (i) connectivity, (ii) feedback, 
(iii) uncertainty, and (iv) innovation.  Kubelec and Sá (2010, p23) also showed that  
 
(1) The interconnectivity of the global financial network has increased significantly over the 
past two decades.  This can be seen from the increase in the size of the nodes and the 
increase in the number and size of the links. 
(2) The distribution of financial links exhibits a long tail.  Measures of skewness and kurtosis 
show the asymmetry compared to the normal distribution.  In particular, the global financial 
network is characterized by a large number of small-weak links and a small number of 
large-strong links.  This suggests that a market with a high freedom of choice will create a 
certain degree of inequality by favoring the upper 20% of the items (“hits" or "head") 
against the other 80% ("non-hits" or "long tail").  This is known as the Pareto principle or 
80–20 rule. 
(3) The average path length of the global financial network has decreased over time.  Average 
path length measures the average of the shortest distance between all pairs of nodes.  In 
2005 there are less than 1.4 degrees of separation on average between any two nodes. 
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(4) The network has become more clustered over time.  The clustering coefficient measures the 
probability that, given that node i is linked to j, and k, nodes j and k are also linked to each 
other.  The increase in this coefficient is another symptom of the increase in 
interconnectivity. 
 
In contrast, links that have long-tailed distribution may not necessary have the property of scale-
free networks whose robustness has been studied by Barabasi (1999, 2002), Albert and Barabási 
(2002) and Albert, et al (2004).  Scale-free networks, demonstrated in World Wide Web, show that 
networks are very vulnerable to targeted attacks hitting a small number of large (strong) links due 
to their most interconnected nodes.  However, a large number of small (weak) links are robust to 
random shocks, since a majority of these nodes have a few small links. 
 
This study extends current features with a new stylized characteristic on currency markets.  This 
concept is about every small node as having as many number of links as the big nodes, and a 
speculative attack on a small node may also spread high impact risks to big nodes.  It may have a 
complete network with full rank.  We show that targeted attacks can place severe stress on small 
nodes with catastrophic consequences, though without weakening the big nodes.  The GFC saw that 
big banks were “too large to fail”.  The recent Greek Debt Crisis saw that for smaller countries that 
are members of larger unions, they too are “too small to fail”.  These rare events suggest that 
whether a node is too big or too small, all interconnected nodes are subject to a Too-Interconnected-
To-Fail phenomenon (Markose, et al, 2010). 
 
Today’s many economic networks are an over-representation of a great many small nodes with 
weak (size) links and a few big nodes with strong (size) links due to globalization.  The number of 
links between these nodes (small and large) in the network is equally large in numbers, and they do 
not exhibit much variability in the number of links.  This pattern is seen in geographic trading bloc 
like the free-trade areas, such as AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area), North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), European Economic Area (EEA), or even a common currency area like the 
Eurozone.  In particular, small nodes with large (number) and weak (size) links are almost 
vulnerable to any kind of shocks. 
 
Figure 2 plots the Asian financial network based on external financial assets and liabilities of Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).  The plot shows that Asia has an almost complete financial network with 
a connectivity of 0.9861 in 2008.  Notice that there is an over-representation of a large number of 
small (weak) links and a small number of large (strong) links.  Hong Kong and Singapore, both 
Asian international financial centers (IFC), are the only two major nodes that send/receive large 
amount of external financial assets (Table 1).  The largest bilateral link is between Hong Kong and 
China (741.6%), which characterizes the feature of being a small number of large links. 
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Figure 2  Asian Financial Network:  External Assets and Liabilities, 2008 
 
Note:  Links are given by the ratio of bilateral assets to GDP of the source country weighted by the trade 
weights.  The size of the nodes is proportional to the country’s financial openness, measured by the 
sum of its total external assets and liabilities. 
Source:  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database. 
 
Table 1  Size of Bilateral Links (%) for Asian Financial Network,  2008 
 
Source:  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database. 
 
The size of the bilateral link is weighted by trade weights and is computed as: 
 
ijt
it
ijt
ijt AGDP
Assets
links ~  
The node i is linked to j at time t is defined as the ratio of gross bilateral assets (all asset classes – 
FDI, equity, debt, foreign exchange reserves) to GDP of the source country.   
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The size of the nodes is proportional to the country’s financial openness, measured by the sum of its 
total external assets and liabilities (Table 2).  Notice also that the size of the node is not a factor in 
determining the size of the links.  Japan has the largest node (2.3), but the bilateral link between 
Singapore-China is even larger than Japan-China.  All in the total number of nodes is 9, and the 
total number of links is 144, and average connectivity is 0.9861 (almost complete connectivity).  
This means that each country has almost a complete network with 16 links.  On average, for a 
country to be qualified as an IFC, it needs its links as thick 100% or greater in order to allow large 
flows of funds.   
 
Table 2  Size of Nodes (US$ million) for Asian Financial Network, 2008 
  Total Assets 
Total 
Liabilities 
Total Assets and 
Liabilities Size of Nodes 
Indonesia 99924 260038 359962 0.0923 
Malaysia 221632 195415 417046 0.1070 
Philippines 63631 107028 170659 0.0438 
Singapore 969874 749979 1719852 0.4412 
Thailand 160274 176339 336612 0.0863 
Japan 5705740 3236043 8941783 2.2936 
Korea 482645 608488 1091132 0.2799 
China  2897472 1477560 4375032 1.1222 
Hong Kong 2260600 1637906 3898506 1.0000 
Source:  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database. 
 
 
3. The Dynamic Phasor Model 
 
We introduce here a dynamic phasor model (Sheng, Kwek, Cho, 2009, 2010) based on engineering 
and physics principles to capture long-tailed networks.  A network is an assemblage of elements 
called nodes, and nodes are connected to one another by a link.  Mimicking the alternating 
electrical waves, we could plot economic variables in the alternating behavior against time (t) in 
terms of their waveforms.  A sine wave is first used to demonstrate the feedback mechanism in the 
phasor model.  Next, we overlap the sine and cosine waves to assess the policy state of a country. 
 
Figure 3 shows a phasor (0P), that is the length of the straight line with an arrow, representing the 
magnitude of the quantity (x,y).  The arrow indicates its direction.  Consider now a phasor (0P), 
rotating in anticlockwise direction with uniform angular velocity (), from a starting position ‘0’.  
If the projections of this phasor on Y-axis are plotted against the angle turned through θ, a sine wave 
is formed.  One complete cycle corresponds to 2 radians.  As it requires time ‘t’ to rotate through 
θ, so θ in radians can be expressed as, 
θ = t radians, 
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where  is the angular velocity in radians/second.  θ can also be expressed as 2ft¸ where  = 2f 
rad/sec.  As this phasor has one cycle, its frequency is f = 1.  The maximum value attained by an 
alternating quantity during positive or negative half cycle is its “Amplitude” (A).   
 
Figure 3  Sine Wave and Phasor-Representation of an Alternating Quantity 
 
Notes:  The Phasor diagram consists of a circle and a cycle.  The size of the circle is the height 
of the cycle (d).  The radius (d) is called a Phasor (0P), and calculated by using the Pythagoras 
theorem:  22 yxd  .  One phase consists of four quadrants (I, II, III, IV).  The radius (d) on 
the circle is equivalent to an amplitude (A), the size of the sinusoidal wave.  One complete cycle 
(one wavelength) of a sine wave is represented by one complete rotation of a phasor.   
 
Mathematical Representation of the Sine Wave 
 
Given a time series )( ty  : 
)1(sin)( tt Amplitudey  
 
 
and  )2()()()( 22  yxd   
 
Then the phasor-velocity is the rate of change of phasor-position at time t: 
 
Phasor-Velocity = )3(.)()()(-)( 1
t
dd
t
d
Time
ntDisplacemePhasor ttt
t 

   
where d( t ) is the phasor-displacement for time-t.  d( t ) is the change in the phasor-
displacement, d( t ) = d( t ) – d( 1t ), and t is time.   
 
The mathematical form of the phasor-force, C( t ), is based on the angular velocity.  Given that the 
“force-in-circular-motion” is (
t
t
r
mF
2 ), where ‘r’ is the radius of the curvature is also ‘d’.   
 
9 
 
In this phasor system, an economic mass (weight of a country) is assumed as m = 1.  Therefore, the 
phasor-force is defined as a change in magnitude at a speed ‘v’ along a path with radius of 
curvature ‘r’ is: 
 
Phasor-Force = )4(
)(
))()((
)(
)()(
2
1
2
t
tt
t
t
t d
ddm
r
mC 

    
 
where ‘r’ is the radius of the curvature is also ‘d’, and  
  is the directional coefficient. 
If  ( 0)()( 1  tt dd  )  then   = = +1, centrifugal force, or 
if  ( 0)()( 1  tt dd  )  then   = = 1, centripetal force. 
 
)( tC   is the “force” that would determine the size of the amplitudes for the sine waves.   
 
Figure 4 illustrates a representation for the feedback mechanism.  It shows that with a positive 
feedback at time t, in the following period (t+1) the amplitude of the sine wave will be enlarged 
(Figure 4, Panel (A)).  With a negative feedback at time t, in the following period (t+1) the 
amplitude of the sine wave will be reduced (Figure 4, Panel (B)).  . 
 
Figure 4  Feedback Mechanism Using Sine Waves 
(A)  Centrifugal Force caused by )()( 1 tt dd   
 
(B)  Centripetal Force caused by )()( 1 tt dd   
 
y t) = Amplitude   sinθt
y t) = Amplitude   sinθt
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Notes:                  + Centrifugal Force 
                             − Centripetal Force 
 
Based on equation (3) and transforming it using )()()( 22 ttt yxd   , and ttt dy  sin)()(   
equation (2) can then also be denoted as:  
 
)5(
))(sin(sin
sin)(sin)(
sin
)(
sin
)(1)(
1
11
1
1 
tt
tttt
t
t
t
t
t
yyyy
t 








 

   
 
Over time, the phasor-force has a time series behavior, )( tC  , that follows a rectangular non-
sinusoidal series (Figure 5).  Predicting the time series behavior of )( tC   at time t is therefore 
helpful for forecasting the size of the sine wave or )( ty   for time t+1.  Policy-makers are more 
interested and concerned with the positive feedback than with negative feedback in any economic 
system (Soros, 1987). 
 
Figure 5  Time Series Sine Waves for Feedback Mechanism 
 
Notes:                  + Centrifugal Force 
                             − Centripetal Force 
 
 
4. Capturing Speculative-Attack in Feedback Mechanism 
 
To capture speculative attack using the feedback-phasors, nine major Asian currencies, i.e. the 
Indonesian Rupiah, Chinese Renminbi, Hong Kong dollar, Korean Won, Japanese Yen, Malaysian 
Ringgit, Philippines Peso, Singapore dollar, and Thai Baht are modeled in the currency markets.  
The study uses annual data, and the period of study is 1990-2008. 
 
Let the coordinates P(x,y) be replaced by P(q, p) in the economic cartesian space.  For the Y-axis, a 
price deviation variable (p) is used to depict price (exchange rates) distortions in the currency 
Centrifugal 
Force Centripetal 
y t)= Amplitude   sinθt 
t  t+1  t+2  t+3 t+4 t+5
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markets.  This price deviation would reflect the price-adjustment policy of a country’s exchange 
rate policy.  For the X-axis, a quantity variable (q) is used to depict macroeconomic state of a 
country.  This quantity-adjustment policy is measured by a country stock variable, which reflects 
the macro-stance through the ratio of current account balance and the level of Gross Domestic 
Product (CA/GDP).  See Appendix (I).  
 
Thus, the radius )( td   is restated as:  
)( td  )()( 22 tt pq    
=  PolicyAdjustmenticePolicyAdjustmentQuantity Pr  
)6()( 2
2
t
t
DevFEER
GDP
CA 

  
 
The price-adjustment policy, that is the deviation from the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate 
(DevFEER), Cline and Williamson (2008, 2010), is the object of interest in this study.  This 
variable is also a measure of currency misalignment from the underlying long-run trend or long-run 
equilibrium.  It also reflects the amount of currency distortions due to cross-border transaction 
costs, diverse foreign exchange administration rules, and other pricing controls which can distort 
the operation costs of managing cross-border flows of currencies.   
 
Summarizing these four overlapping quadrants gives four regions of imbalances: 
Quadrant I :  Surplus and Undervaluation (S,U), 
Quadrant II:  Deficit and Undervaluation (D,U), 
Quadrant III:  Deficit and Overvaluation (D,O), and 
Quadrant IV:  Surplus and Overvaluation (S,O). 
 
In an economic sense, Quadrants II, III and IV are not sustainable in the long-run.  Quadrant I is the 
most preferable quadrant by policy-makers, because a country with current account surplus and 
undervaluation of its exchange rates can act as a buffer to reduce the impact of a targeted attack on 
its domestic economy. 
 
Table 3 gives the empirical estimates for d(θt), the phasor-displacement in equation (2) for the nine 
Asian currencies, and these ds are used to compute the estimates of the phasor-velocity, v(θt), in 
equation (3).  These computed d(θt) for the circles are also amplitudes for the sine waves, which 
give the waveform representations for the y(θt) variable, i.e. deviation of the fundamental 
equilibrium exchange rate or currency misalignment due to misallocation of domestic resources.   
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Table 3  Empirical Estimates for Phasor-Displacement d(θt), and Phasor-Velocity v(θt),  
for Asia (1992 – 2008) 
 
 
 
The computed values of the phasor-velocity, v(θt), are then used to compute the values for the 
phasor-force, in equation (4) for 1992-2008 (Table 4).   
 
Table 4  Parameter Estimates for the Phasor-Force C(θt) 
 
Notes: + Sign is centrifugal force, and  Sign is centripetal force 
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Interestingly, the estimated phasor-force results for 2009 and 2010 in Table 4, suggest that some 
Asia countries (excluding Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and China) were not 
spared from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the second ‘rare event’ with long-tailed black 
swan risk in Asia.  This time round, only two countries experienced such extreme values of positive 
feedback, namely Hong Kong and Japan (in 2009).  Hong Kong received the largest positive 
feedback of 5.0048, and interestingly, Japan received the smallest positive feedback value of 
0.0719.   
 
These extreme positive values in Hong Kong were fallouts triggered by sale of mini junk bonds 
sold by Lehman Brothers.  On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection (marking the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history) following the massive 
exodus of most of its clients.  It was not surprising that Hong Kong was most exposed.  Hong Kong 
housed eight of the Lehman Brothers' based units: Lehman Brothers Asia Holdings Limited, 
Lehman Brothers Securities Asia Limited, Lehman Brothers Futures Asia Limited, Lehman 
Brothers Asia Limited, Lehman Brothers Commercial Corporation Limited, Lehman Brothers Asia 
Capital Company, LBQ Hong Kong Funding Limited and Lehman Brothers Nominees (HK) 
Limited.  In contrast, the Japanese Yen exposure to the GFC was hedged by its exchange rate 
flexibility.  This gives room for its exchange rate to adjust or “wiggle” its way out of the tail risk to 
restore financial stability.  However, the depreciating US dollar has instead fuelled the Yen carry 
trade. 
 
Figure 6 plots the feedback mechanism for the estimated sine waves )( ty   and the phasor-force 
)(ˆ tC  .  This Figure clearly shows the size of the ‘rare event’ (extremes positive feedback values) in 
1997/1998, i.e. the Asian Financial Crisis, had badly damaged the network of four countries, 
namely, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.  First, notice how the size of the sine waves were 
greatly enlarged in 1998 after contracting a positive feedback in 1997.  This enlarged sine waves 
due to positive feedback in the previous period.  This positive feedback is consistently 
demonstrated in these four crisis economies.  Second, also notice that the following period (1999), 
these extreme positive feedback values have dissipated, and that it occured only once like a Black 
Swan, and the impact of the highly improbable.  The consecutive size of the sine wave is reduced 
substantially. 
 
The aftermath of the AFC saw Thailand switched from a fixed exchange rate regime to a managed 
floating exchange rate regime with inflation targeting framework.  For the case of Malaysia, she 
switched from a managed floating exchange rate regime to a pegged to the US dollar exchange rate 
regime.  Hong Kong, which adopts a Currency Board for its exchange rate arrangement, is the only 
country in Asia that had experienced large positive feedback.  Hong Kong is able to withstand such 
large positive feedback because it has accumulated large foreign reserves, US$92.8 billion, to 
defend itself from speculative attacks on its domestic currency.  Hong Kong’s foreign reserves had 
increased to US$182.47 billion in 2008, a 98% increase. 
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Figure 6  Capturing Speculative Attack Through Feedback Mechanism 
 
 
Notes:  Extreme Positive Feedback is defined as Speculative-Targeted Attack. 
              Centrifugal Force due to Positive Feedback 
              Centripetal Force due to Negative Feedback 
Speculative‐Targeted Attack, 1997/98 AFC
Speculative‐Targeted Attack, 1997/98 AFC
Speculative‐Targeted Attack, 1997/98 AFC Speculative‐Targeted Attack, 1997/98 AFC 
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5. Assessing Policy-Space in Network-Phasors 
 
We can further model the market movements caused by the confluence of different market forces, 
by transforming the market movements (x,y) into sinusoidal waves (cosθ, sinθ).  In particular, when 
the two forces collide (cosθ = sinθ), they create directions that are not always predictable, though 
the amplitude of the sine waves and the cosine waves are predictable.   
 
Here, we apply the sinusoidal waves to be used to assess the policy state of a country.  Overlapping 
the sine (sineθ) and cosine (cosθ) waves will map the policy-space of a country.  This policy-space 
(yellow area) can be used to interpret the economic state of macroeconomic policies, i.e. in normal 
state (stable state) versus abnormal state (crisis state) (Figure 7).  In normal state, the area between 
the sine and cosine waves would be large.  In a crisis state, the policy-space would narrow.   
 
Normal State 
In normal condition, the location of the red dot and the blue dot is far apart.  Thus, the value of cosθ 
 sinθ (red dot is apart from the blue dot).  The further apart value of the cosθ from sinθ, the more 
successful are economic policies in influencing the economy (as they are “coordinated”). 
 
Abnormal State 
In abnormal condition, the location of the red dot and the blue dot will be overlapped.  The value of 
cosθ = sinθ.  At this point, the sine wave also intersects with the cosine wave. 
 
 
Figure 7  Policy-State Representation through Sinusoidal Waves 
 
 
Sine Wave 
Cosine Wave 
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Figure 8 plots the policy-state for the network-phasors in the nine currencies.  It is worth noting that 
the speculative targeted attack and the collapse of the Thai baht in 1997, saw the “clash” of the sine 
and cosine waves for Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea.  Interestingly, this network effect 
demonstrates that nodes with stronger links are less susceptible to the long-tailed Black Swan risks, 
like the Japanese Yen and the Singaporean dollar.   
 
Notice also that Singapore and Hong Kong in the 2000s, have financial networks which are 
characterized by thick policy-space – which also reflects the country status’ as an IFC.  This is 
because Hong Kong and Singapore, being IFCs, need not “fly in concert” with the common 
network.  Malaysia’s sizeable policy-space could be explained by its strategy to establish her as the 
international Islamic financial centre. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Exchange rates networks can be characterized by fat-tailed networks characteristics.  A speculative-
targeted attack at one of the small nodes with weak links in the system could also cause wide-
spread damage.  In this sense, a fat-tailed network with ‘small world’ property, tells us that today’s 
financial phenomena are too-interconnected-to-fail. 
 
The results of the study do show that we are able to capture these rare events.  While not all 
directional changes are predictable due to lack of contextual information that we may not be able to 
capture, there are certain patterns of behaviour that conform with tools common in engineering and 
physics. 
 
First, the findings strongly show that a targeted attack, like the Asian Financial Crisis, at any one of 
weak nodes, it can cause smaller and bigger nodes in the network to collapse.  Second, the findings 
also suggest that exchange rate flexibility is a very important feature for a country to absorb any 
Black Swan risk.  Any speculative targeted attack would also change the nature of the exchange 
rate regime.  For instance, Thailand switched from fixed to floating, and Malaysia switched from 
floating to fixed during the Asian Financial Crisis (Ito, 2007, Sheng, 2009).  Third, the policy-space 
of the network-phasor can be used to predict any impending crises.  Large policy-space is preferred 
as it can be used to buffer any speculative attack.  When the two forces collide (cosθ = sinθ), the 
size of the amplitude of the following sine waves and the cosine waves are always enlarged. 
 
Interestingly, applying the network theory to exchange rate systems do conform to tools common in 
engineering and physics measured through their alternating feedback mechanism.  The network 
theory could capture these network behaviors of these nine Asian currency markets, because the 
network effect for Asia has gone through regionalism, a process that was created through shared 
market risks, and coordinated macroeconomic policies. 
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Figure 8  Policy-Space in Network Phasors 
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APPENDIX (I) 
 
I. Phasor Representation and Waveforms in Economic System 
 
 
 
The origin “0” implies no market distortions either in the currency market or the current account balance.  
Markets are balanced, and are in equilibrium (demand equals supply). 
 
The Y-axis represents country’s Price-Adjustment Policy. 
For the Y-axis, the deviation from the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate, denoted as DevFEER, 
represents price distortions for the currency market.  It is an index that reflects the deviation of country’s 
bilateral exchange rates from the fundamental equilibrium exchange rates (FEERs).  FEER is a concept 
based on the works of John Williamson, the father of macroeconomic exchange rates misalignment (see See 
URL:  
http://www.iie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=15). 
 
If DevFEER = 0, it means market distortions does not exist.   
If DevFEER > 0, it implies the spot exchange rate against the US dollar is undervalued (U).   
And if DevFEER < 0, it implies the spot exchange rate against the US dollar is overvalued (O).  DevFEER is 
computed as the deviation of the bilateral exchange rate index (1992 = 100) from the fundamental 
equilibrium exchange rates.   
 
The X-axis represents country’s Quantity-Adjustment Policy. 
For the X-axis, when CA = GDP, it implies a quantity of balanced macro stance.  However, this situation is 
impossible to achieve in economic realities.   
If CA > GDP, it implies current account surplus (S), and if CA < GDP, it implies current account deficit (D).  
 
0
